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To analyze whether internationalization affects firm 
performance in Japanese firms. Internationalization is 
examined through the degree of foreign ownership and the 
inclusion of one or more outsider foreign directors. 
 
Fixed effects panel data regressions where firm performance, 
measured in Tobin’s Q and ROA, are dependent variables 
which are regressed against the share of foreign ownership, 
the inclusion of one or more outsider foreign directors and 
control variables. 
 
The theoretical framework consists of previous research on 
foreign directors, foreign ownership and their effects on firm 
performance. Furthermore, the effects from the convergence 
of the conventional Japanese corporate governance system 
with the Anglo-American model is discussed.  
 
The study is based on a sample of 250 firms from the Tokyo 
stock exchange’s first section between 2010 and 2013, 
amounting to a total of 1000 observations. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that internationalization has 
a significant, positive effect on firm performance. When 
Tobin’s Q is used as a measure for firm performance both 
foreign directors and foreign ownership yield positive effects. 
For the ROA regression on the other hand, only foreign 
ownership is shown to add a significant positive effect. ROA 
as a measurement of firm performance is suggested to be less 
suitable for capturing positive signaling effects that might 
stem from including foreign directors. This is advocated to 
explain the non-significance. 
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the background and recent developments for the study are presented. This will 
later in in the chapter be used to build the thesis’ purpose and research questions. At the end 
of the chapter the delimitations used in the study will be conferred. 
 
1.1 Background 
Internationalization appears as markets move closer and closer to each other and corporations 
operates across borders. While some countries can be considered to be more internationalized 
and thus more adapted to international standards than others, Japan stands out in its unique 
ways of doing business and preserving tradition. In the postwar years until the 1980’s, the gap 
between international and Japanese methods also extended into firms’ corporate governance 
systems, retaining a rather unique way of governing companies (Jackson & Miyajima, 2007). 
The most outstanding differences included large insider dominated boards, banks providing 
both capital and monitoring for the shareholders and companies being part of large business 
networks with cross-holdings (Jackson & Miyajima, 2007; Stulz, 1999). However, after the 
asset price bubble burst in the 1991 many from corporate Japan felt that a change was needed 
towards a more American or British-style of corporate governance (Jackson & Miyajima, 
2007). 
 
Conversely, even today there are still firms that applies the old system. One example is the 
power company many hold responsible for the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi: TEPCO 
(Benes, 2011). TEPCO had an earlier history of falsifying nuclear safety reports (Economist, 
2002) and the radiation emittance after the earthquake in 2011 were very likely to be a result 
of a disregard for outside company opinions (Flannery, 2011). The corporate board of 
TEPCO, consisted of 20 directors, of which 18 were insiders and one of the two outsiders was 
affiliated with TEPCO through another financial institution (Tricker, 2012). The insiders were 
qualified by the tenure inside the firm and the head of the board had never been elected from 
outside the company (Tricker, 2012).The case of TEPCO along with many other corporate 
governance related scandals suggest that Japanese firms still today need to rethink their 
governance systems to make operations and decisions more transparent.  
 
Japanese firms today are not only facing pressure by the public, but also by a growing number 
of international shareholders to internationalize their corporate governance system 
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(Ahmadjian, 2007). This is largely influenced by the increase in investments from foreign 
corporations and further by the portfolio ownership of American and British mutual funds, 
which has risen successively during the last 25 years (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2013).  
 
However, adapting to a new system can be hard and costly. Differences in legal systems, in 
stock markets, in ownership structures and in the culture of the country are all factors to 
consider when changing corporate governance system (Tricker, 2012). Making changes in 
corporate governance without considering these factors will end up leading to suboptimal firm 
performance, according to Anderson & Gupta (2013) and have in the past created mismatches 
with the Japanese business infrastructure (Stulz, 1999). 
 
One relatively unexplored field of research is how internationalization, in the form of hiring 
foreign directors, affects firm performance. Oxelheim & Randøy (2003), suggest that if firms 
want a quick start to importing a new corporate governance system, they can include foreign 
directors with experience about another system in order to signal to the market that the 
company is ready to undergo changes. The foreign directors also provide knowledge about the 
foreign markets, both in the business and the financial markets field.  
 
Internationalization in the form of a higher degree of foreign shareholdings can also 
contribute to firm performance. In previous studies, firms with high levels of foreign 
ownership has been shown to increase divestitures and dividends while also taking on a 
higher degree of corporate risk level (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Baba, 2009; Nguyen, 
2012). These traits are suggested by the authors to have positive effects on firm performance 
while further making the firms approach a more Anglo-American way of doing business. 
 
In this study, the author will examine the effect that internationalization, measured through 
foreign directors and foreign ownership, has on Japanese firms’ performance. 
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1.2 Previous research 
 
1.2.1 Foreign directors – effects on firm performance 
Outsider foreign directors from the U.S., Canada and U.K’s effect on firm performance in the 
Nordic region was first tested by Oxelheim & Randøy (2003). The researchers used a random 
sample of 253 traded firms, based in Sweden and Norway and had a sample period of 3 years. 
The results showed a significantly higher firm performance for firms that had recruited an 
Anglo-American board member than for firms that had not. 10% of firms in Norway and 16% 
in Sweden had a foreign director on their board. The results are discussed to originate from 
that by including an Anglo-American board member, the company signals a willingness to 
make a change towards the Anglo-American corporate board system. This in turn is suggested 
to enhance the international orientation of the firm. 
 
Conversely, a study performed by Masulis et al. (2012) on U.S. firms advocates the opposite. 
With a sample of 9979 firms and a time-period measuring from 1998 to 2006, firms with 
foreign independent directors (FIDs) displayed significantly poorer results than their 
counterparts. This was especially apparent as the firm’s business presence lessened in the 
country which the foreign director resided in. The authors explain this by the larger number of 
board meetings missed by FIDs because of long travel times. This in turn is suggested to lead 
to less time to perform monitoring activities.  
 
In a bachelor thesis, with theory drawn from Oxelheim & Randøy (2003), Japanese firms 
which include foreign directors show significantly higher performance than comparable firms 
(Sugai, et al., 2008). The sample consists of roughly 60 firms, including foreign directors each 
year from 2006 to 2008. In order to compare companies including foreigner directors to those 
that did not, the authors used a sample, counter sample method. Here they selected two 
similar firms without foreign board members to the firm with one or more foreign directors. 
The firms selected were nearest in terms of total assets, and being the same industry as the 
firm with foreign director(s). This way of selecting is not completely unbiased and thus the 
results from this thesis might be less credible than the two previous articles which are both 
published. 
 
The previous research conveys that the effect of recruiting foreign directors has on firm 
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performance is still uncertain. Depending on the region of the sample as well as how foreign 
directors are defined, the results will obviously change. A more in depth analysis of what 
factors may change the results and how including foreign directors could add to firm 
performance are discussed in the theory chapter, section 3.3.  
 
 
1.2.2 Foreign ownership – effects on firm performance 
The effects of foreign ownership on firm performance in Japan have been studied earlier, but 
not extensively. 
  
Ferris & Park (2005) show a positive effect on firm performance from foreign ownership. 
However they find that a curvilinear relation exists between the two variables. For foreign 
equity ownership of up to 40%, firms yield an inclining positive performance, but for firms 
with over 40%, the results begin to decline.  
 
A recent article from Nakano & Nguyen (2013) shows that foreign ownership in the 
electronics industry lead to increased performance from 2005 to 2011. They attribute the 
results, among others, to that foreign investors are more likely hinder Japanese firms from 
holding too much cash, and not being risky enough.  
 
Phung & Le (2013) examine foreign ownership’s effect on firm performance in Vietnam. 
Contrary to previous studies, they find a significant negative effect on firm performance. They 
describe that like Japan, Vietnam is characterized by an inefficient corporate governance 
system. They further discuss the reason for the poor results to be attributed to that foreign 
investors cannot perform adequate monitoring of the firms in the Vietnamese environment.  
 
To summarize, firm performance in a Japan seems to be positively affected by foreign 
ownership, but one study of another Asian country suggest a negative impact. The way 
foreign owners are suggested to change to firm in order to raise firm performance will be 
discussed in the theory chapter, section 3.3.  
 
1.3 Problem discussion 
This thesis will examine internationalization through two channels: The first being the 
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inclusion of an outsider Anglo-American board member. The Anglo-American restriction is 
being used since the signaling effects for firms moving towards an Anglo-American corporate 
governance system are thought to be most apparent when including a director from that 
region. Previous research suggests both that the inclusion of foreign directors on the corporate 
board can increase firm performance but also decrease it (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003; cf. 
Masulis et al., 2012).  
 
The definition of Anglo-American board member used in this study will be an individual 
which now has, or previously had a citizenship in either the U.S. or in one of the 
U.K./Commonwealth countries. For Commonwealth countries, the author uses Tricker’s 
(2012) definition which is: Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and 
Singapore. These countries’ company laws have been influenced by the U.K. since they were 
once members of the old British Empire. Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) only used U.S., 
Canadian and British board members in their original study, but since Japan’s geographical 
location is different than the Nordic countries, the author believes that greater leeway needs to 
be given to include board members from the Asia/Pacific region. 
 
This study will also be performed in a Japanese setting, where the author suggests that the 
differences in corporate governance systems are larger than in the Nordic countries, examined 
by Oxelheim & Randøy (2003). This might lead to increased signaling effects from taking on 
another corporate governance system. However, the Japanese market is also a much larger 
market than the Nordic one, which may mitigate the effects of approaching the Anglo-
American market because it may be easier for the company to issue equity, and get access to 
capital in the domestic market than for the smaller Nordic economies.  
 
The other channel used will be foreign ownership. Two earlier studies find positive effects in 
firm performance, related to a higher degree of foreign ownership (Ferris & Park, 2005; 
Nakano & Nguyen, 2013). However, since Nakano & Nguyen (2013) only find increased 
performance results during the end of their sample it is not certain if the results will persist 
today. Phung & Le (2013) further show negative results from increased foreign ownership in 
Vietnam, attributing this to that the foreign shareholders does not provide adequate 
monitoring in the Vietnamese firms.  
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If Japanese owned firms increased their divestitures, dividends and corporate risk taking 
maybe they would not see themselves beaten in firm performance and the foreign ownership 
effect would not be as large as before. The same argument could be made for change towards 
a more transparent corporate governance system. Yet we see that many Japanese firms 
stagnates in changing corporate governance and fails to apply it fully out (Buchanan, 2009). 
On the other hand, the amount of foreign ownership is rising each year, and there have also 
been indications of foreign institutional funds targeting Japanese companies with low risk 
profiles (Nguyen, 2012). This suggests that the foreign owners anticipate increased 
performance which in turn yields a higher payoff.  
 
In this study, the author will look at data from recent years. This might mean that the number 
of foreign directors and share of foreign ownership have increased, making it easier to draw 
clear results but may also yield different results stemming from new market conditions.  
 
This thesis will contribute to the research field by discussing the foreigner directors’ effect on 
a market where board diversity is relatively new, and foreigners are only making up a small 
part of the board. It will further look to shed more light on what effects foreign ownership 
have on firm performance, to try to answer the question of why an increase in foreign 
shareholdings of Japanese firms can be observed.  
 
1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is as follows:  
 
To examine whether internationalization affects firm performance in Japanese firms. 
 
The purpose will be divided into two more specific research questions:  
 
1: How does including Anglo-American outsider directors on the corporate board affect firm 
performance in Japanese firms? 
 
2: How does foreign ownership affect firm performance in Japanese firms? 
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1.5 Delimitation 
The study is limited to the 250 largest, listed firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s first 
section, based on net sales. The reason for choosing listed firms is that they provide both 
corporate governance reports at the Tokyo Stock Exchange website (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
2015), as well as the share of foreign ownership in securities reports from the financial 
services agency (Financial Services Agency, 2015). The benefits of choosing larger 
companies is that the author suggest that they have a wider network, making it easier for them 
to find foreign directors which are suitable for the firm. This will in turn make answering the 
first research question less difficult. Recent research further confirms that the share of foreign 
directors in the 30 largest firms is about 2.1% of all directors which is a larger amount than 
the 0.17% of directors in all Japanese firms (Fujishima, 2009; c.f Tricker, 2012). In order to 
prevent possible biases originating from selecting large firms for the sample, firm size will be 
controlled for in the regression analysis, see 4.5.2.3 General control variables. Furthermore, 
this thesis will examine a four year time period, spanning from 2010 to 2013. This window 
was selected to be able to research the most recent developments while still have accessible 
data from the financial software. More details on delimitations imposed on the sample to be 
able perform the chosen methodology are presented in chapter 4.2.  
 
1.6 Audience 
This thesis is aimed at students and researchers with knowledge about corporate governance. 
Further, the author hopes that the study will be of interest for Japanese firms, looking to 
recruit foreign directors or to make changes in their corporate governance system. 
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2. Institutional conditions  
To be able to investigate the effects that internationalization has on Japanese firms, the 
institutional conditions from the conventional Japanese-, American-, and 
U.K./Commonwealth- corporate governance models are presented. Lastly, recent 
developments from the implementation of the Abenomics program will be conferred. 
 
2.1 The conventional Japanese corporate governance system 
Tricker (2012) describes that many Japanese companies are tightly intertwined into business 
groups in which cross-holdings of shares are common and were directors serve on many 
boards within their own network, called “keiretsu”. He explains that trade within the network 
is common and that it usually includes a financial institution. Tricker (2012) further 
demonstrates that for companies within keiretsu systems, corporate boards are large and are 
mainly using the Japanese system of lifetime employment in which tenure in a firm is linked 
with rewards. Here, directors tends to be promoted into the corporate board from within the 
keiretsu (Tricker, 2012). By extension, this means that the number of independent outside 
directors becomes relatively small.  
 
The hierarchal system found in Japanese culture also influences the decision making process 
on corporate boards (Tricker, 2012). Tricker (2012) shows this with an example where board 
directors lower down in the chain often have a more decision-ratifying role compared to the 
Anglo-American system, were board members tend to be more initiative taking. Because of 
the many informal meetings between management, board directors and other members of the 
keiretsu, a kind of social structure is created where the people with the last word will be the 
top ones, namely the president of the company and the chairman of the board (Tricker, 2012). 
Rather, than being put in place to represent shareholders as in the Anglo-American system, 
lower tier Japanese directors are used mostly because of their connections with outside parties 
such as government, banks and other firms within the same industry (Tricker, 2012).  
 
The implication of this system is that the power of shareholders are not as significant as the 
power that lies within the keiretsu. The Japanese pension funds has tried to encourage firms 
which it invests in to at least attain a return on equity of 8% but so far, no effects has been 
seen (Tricker, 2012).  
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The Asian Corporate Governance Association (2008) describes the way most listed 
companies fail to meet the needs of the shareholders and the country: 
 
 “By not providing for adequate supervision of corporate strategy 
 
 By protecting management from discipline of the market, thus rendering the 
development of a healthy and efficient market in corporate control all but impossible 
 
 By failing to provide the returns that are vitally necessary to protect Japan’s social 
safety net – its pension system” 
 
The paper further encourages firms to, among others: recognize minority shareholders as 
owners, use capital more efficiently and to independently supervise management.  
 
2.2 The American corporate board system 
The American system is based around following strict laws provided in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act from 2002 (Tricker, 2012). For instance, the requirements for listing a company mean that 
a board audit, nomination and remuneration committee has to be instated. Companies also 
have to apply GAAP accounting rules in which there are strict penalties for directors who do 
not comply (Tricker, 2012).  
 
Tricker (2012) describes the trait of the American model is to have unitary boards, contrary to 
the common dual board system in for example: Germany. He continues to explain that 
American boards are composed largely of independent outside directors, where the 
shareholders have little influence on deciding the formation of board members. The only 
method they can use is to show their dissatisfaction by not voting, selling their shares or 
resorting to legal process (Tricker, 2012). Finally he adds that in the U.S., the position of 
chairman of the board and CEO are often held by the same person, even though many 
shareholders actively oppose it.  
 
2.3 The UK/Commonwealth corporate governance system 
According to Tricker (2012), the UK/Commonwealth model differ from the American model 
in a sense that it is based more on principle than on law. He explains it with the fact that there 
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is a corporate code that firms are expected to follow, and if they do not, they will have to 
explain themselves. This means that there can be no legal repercussions for breaking the code, 
and that this regulation is largely left to the market to decide. Tricker (2012) further describes 
that opposed to the American system, it is more common to have separate individuals for the 
posts of the chairman of the board and for the CEO. Lastly, he adds that shareholders which 
have over 10% of the voting rights can summon an extraordinary meeting and vote on 
strategic decisions or removal of a director.  
 
2.4 The Anglo-American system 
According to Nisa (2008) the similarities between the American and British/Commonwealth 
systems are often referred to as the Anglo-American system and can be described as focusing 
on the rights of the “outsiders”. This is achieved by separating the control of the firm from the 
ownership of the firm by allowing for many institutional and smaller shareholders (Nisa, 
2008).  
 
The ownership of Anglo-American firms is dispersed and consists mainly of individual and 
institutional investors compared to in Japan were banks and holding companies are the major 
investors (Tricker, 2012). See Table 1. 
 
Table 2.4.1 Differences in firm ownership (Tricker, 2012) 
 
Country Individuals Institutional 
investors 
Banks and 
government 
Holding 
company 
Foreign1 
USA 51% 41% 3% 0% 5% 
U.K. 19% 58% 5% 2% 16% 
Japan 20% 21% 23% 28% 8% 
 
In a study with a sample from 2000-2007, board size in both the U.S. and the U.K. is shown 
to be 11.3 in the U.S. and 10.69 in the U.K. and the quota of independent directors was 84% 
in the U.S. and 57% in the UK (Muller-Kahle, et al., 2014).  
This can be compared to a study of larger firms on the Tokyo Stock exchange from 2007 
                                                 
1 It is not stated whether the foreign column include foreign institutional investors or not. 
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where the average board size of Japan is 12.22 and percentage of outsider directors is just 
13% (Johansson & Sawaguchi, 2009). 
 
Nakao (2008) describes the Anglo-American corporate governance system to be based on 
“external market control” which are being shown in these observed characteristics: 
 
 Corporate shares are dispersedly distributed. Investors have little influence on 
corporate operation and management.  
 
 Monitoring are performed by external directors which play an important role in 
corporate governance. 
 
 Employees, linked to firm by employment contracts have little influence on corporate 
governance. 
 
 There is a developed securities market in which the shareholders can sell their shares 
if the company is not performing well. Mergers and Acquisitions based on market 
pressure are very common. 
 
  A working legal system is in place which sees to that important information is being 
conveyed to the shareholders, insider trade is controlled and minority shareholders are 
being protected.  
 
A summary from all of the discussed traits from both the conventional Japanese system and 
the Anglo-American model is presented below. 
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2.5 Summary of corporate governance systems 
Table 2.5.1 Summary of corporate governance systems 
The Anglo-American corporate governance 
system 
The conventional Japanese corporate 
governance system 
Shareholder oriented Stakeholder oriented 
Dispersed ownership Stable owners, cross-holdings 
Flexible labor market Lifetime employment 
Small board of directors Large board of directors 
Outsiders in majority on the boards Few outside directors 
Many takeovers Few takeovers 
Debt financing through bonds Debt financing through banks 
 
2.6 Criticism against the Anglo-American definition 
Because differences persist between the U.K./Commonwealth and U.S. corporate governance 
system, researchers has criticized the use of an Anglo-American corporate governance model 
e.g. (Mullineux, 2010). For this thesis, the author mainly consider the Anglo-American model 
for firms trying to change their corporate governance system and not policymakers. This 
meaning that features which are unchangeable for firms are disregarded. One example of this 
is that the U.S. has very strict laws, related to corporate governance which essentially are 
unchangeable for firms while the U.K./Commonwealth countries makes use of codes which 
could be applied by firms (Tricker, 2012).. Furthermore, in this thesis the Anglo-American 
system is used to indicate the opposing model to the traditional Japanese corporate 
governance system. It could however be argued that there is convergence towards the 
U.K./Commonwealth model and the U.S. model in Japan, but for simplicity’s sake the author 
will use the Anglo-American model when addressing the convergence of corporate 
governance models system in Japan. 
 
2.7 The Abenomics program 
Japan has recently entered a large financial reform program named ”Abenomics” after the 
Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe. According to Boesler (2013), the program consists of 
three parts: increases in government spending, a massive increase in monetary stimulus and 
reforms, aimed to improve the Japanese economy. Boesler (2013) continues to explain that 
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one of the goals of the Abenomics program is to be able to get out of the long period of 
deflation that Japan has been stuck in and thus revitalizing the Japanese economy. While the 
goal of the monetary policy has been to reduce interest rates, it has further helped weaken the 
Japanese yen, leading to increased exports and an overall boost to the Japanese stock market 
(Boesler, 2013). However, in order to increase public spending, one of the reforms that 
needed to be carried through was an increase in sales tax from 5 to 8 percent in the end of 
2013. This in turn affected the Japanese economy negatively, leading to a drop in 
consumption in in the start of 2014 (Pandey, 2014). While the long term effects of the 
Abenomics program still remain unknown, the initial positive effects from the stock markets 
and the lower interest rates could have an impact on the results from this study, leading to 
measures being taken to control for this. More details will follow in the methodology section. 
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3. Theory 
In order to establish hypotheses about the effects that foreign directors and foreign ownership 
might add to firm performance, the effects of implementing the Anglo-American system in 
Japan are described. The roots of the effects from foreign directors and foreign ownership 
will then be explained and the thesis hypotheses will be established. 
 
3.1 Convergence with the Anglo-American system in Japan 
As we will see in this section, the Japanese corporate governance system has started to 
converge more and more with the Anglo-American model, for both the Japanese firms 
wanting change (Tricker, 2012) and pressure from foreign investors to adapt to the Anglo-
American corporate governance system (Ahmadjian, 2007). One example of such pressure is 
CalPERS’s usage of a corporate governance code called “Global Principles of Accountable 
Corporate Governance” which dictates were the US$200 billion pension fund is going to 
invest their members’ money (Tricker, 2012). 
 
According to Tricker (2012), recent cross-holding of shares has declined and a new market for 
corporate control has started to emerge. He further notes the first hostile takeover ever on the 
Tokyo Exchange were recorded in 2007.  
 
Buchanan (2009) observes convergence, in that the Japanese government opened up for a 
different corporate governance model in 2002, which enabled and expansion of the external 
directors’ roles within the firm called “committee system”. His analysis shows that the effect 
of the implementation led to an initial increase in the number of external directors but has 
somewhat stagnated and their roles are still mainly advisory rather than monitoring. Eberhart 
(2012) compares firms using the committee system with the old system and finds increased 
firm performance for firms using the new system. He attributes this to the signaling effects of 
moving the firm into a more transparent state, with increased monitoring by outsiders and a 
reduction of agency costs due to information asymmetry.  
 
On the other hand, Anderson & Gupta (2013) find that firms that have adopted the Anglo-
American corporate governance performed sub-optimally because of a bad match with their 
own country’s financial and legal systems. They suggest that increased performance only can 
be observed when the new corporate governance system is tailored efficiently after the home 
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country’s specific requirements.  
 
An example of this bad matching was the banks’ role in raising new capital and the 
monitoring of firms in Japan. Stulz (1999) explains that before the 1980’s Japanese firms 
were prevented from raising public debt in open markets and thus relied solely on banks to 
take on debt. He further continues that in return, the banks monitored shareholders, enabling 
them to threaten to withhold funds if the managers started shirking. The article concludes that 
opening up the possibility of raising funds in foreign markets actually worsened Japanese 
corporate governance drastically because it made the firms lose their strict ties to the banks. 
This happened in the transition period before the new shareholders were able to start 
monitoring, and thus left a gap in the governance of the firm (Stulz, 1999).  
 
3.2 Foreign ownership 
Aggregate foreign ownership in Japan is a number that has risen from a mere 4.1% in 1987 to 
an impressive 30.8% in 2013, making foreign owners larger than the national financial 
institutions who only owned 26.7% (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2013). Out of these foreign 
shareholders, a majority were institutional investors since only 0.5% could be considered to 
be individual investors in 2008 (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2009). The underlying interest that 
foreign investors have differs in many ways from those of the Japanese investors especially 
for institutional investors. Ahmadjian (2007) describes that U.S. and U.K. funds are bound by 
legal obligations which dictate how they can act with their investors’ funds. She adds that 
rules like this exists in Japan as well but are not followed as diligently. She further notes that 
while foreign funds have been found to focus primarily on the return on their investments, the 
Japanese investors are more intertwined in relationships of cross-holdings and can thus be 
forced to invest in a firm because of an obligation created within the earlier discussed keiretsu 
system. By extension, this means that the Japanese institutional investors are able to impose 
less pressure on their target firms compared to the foreign investors (Ahmadjian, 2007).  
 
Foreign ownership in Japan is also a part of internationalization and has been linked with 
increased divestitures (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005). The study looks at institutional 
investors between 1991 and 2000 and finds that companies in which foreign owners replaced 
Japanese owners, started to downsize and divest assets. Divestitures announcements have 
been linked with abnormal returns in for example Gadada & Thomas (2005) which speaks of 
19 
  
it as a factor which contributes to firm performance. Baba (2009) connects foreign ownership 
of Japanese firms with increased dividends payouts. This can be interpreted as showing 
greater financial discipline and may thus lead to a greater firm performance. Furthermore, a 
higher foreign ownership has also shown to raise corporate risk taking, and especially 
interesting is the fact that foreign investors seems to have deliberately chosen less risky 
Japanese firms as their targets (Nguyen, 2012). Since there is a well-known connection 
between risk and return (Fama, 1970), firms with foreign ownership should exhibit better 
performance than the Japanese-owned ones. Nakano & Nguyen (2013) confirms the increase 
in firm performance from foreign ownership in their study of the Japanese electronics industry 
from the years 2005 to 2011.   
 
On the other hand, Phung & Le (2013) finds negative results in firm performance originating 
from a higher level of foreign ownership. They suggest that because of the inefficient 
corporate governance system and an asymmetric market in their sample country of Vietnam, 
foreign owners could not perform their monitoring function in the firms adequately, leading to 
a decrease in firm performance. Essentially they argue that because Vietnam is still an 
emerging market, the level of foreign ownership is not sufficient to provide comprehensive 
monitoring, and thus the firms end up with worse monitoring than before the foreign owners 
entered. These results can be connected with what Stulz (1999) describes about the gap that 
occurred in corporate governance when Japanese firm’s became able to raise funds through 
foreign markets.  
 
Evidence from Ahmadjian (2007) suggests that firms with foreign institutional investors are 
taking on reforms towards a more Anglo-American corporate governance system. According 
to the study, these reforms include equity-based performance measures, changing the board 
formation and responsibilities as well as the communication with shareholders. This is 
interesting since it is not just American and British investors which propose the 
implementation of the Anglo-American corporate governance system, but also investment 
firms and banks from France and Germany have been shown to promote this system when 
investing in Japan (Ahmadjian, 2007).  
 
Aggarwal, et al. (2011) shows causality between that firms with higher international 
institutional ownership affects the corporate governance system and not the other way around. 
They show that firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to get rid of a poorly 
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performing CEO and that institutional investors can use the changing of corporate governance 
systems as mean to create value for the firm. 
 
As discussed in this and the previous chapter, there are mixed results of implementing the 
Anglo-American corporate governance system in different countries. The benefits can be 
summarized as getting rid of information asymmetries towards investors, which reduce 
agency costs while the disadvantages could be that the new system matches poorly with the 
existing business infrastructure that the target country applies.  
 
Most of the evidence discussed in the previous research section suggests a connection 
between a high foreign ownership and a high firm performance. Furthermore, the aggregate 
foreign ownership has risen even more since previous studies were performed, making it an 
interesting case for further examination. 
 
The first hypothesis is therefore:  
Japanese firms with higher share of foreign ownership have higher firm performance than 
firms with lower share of foreign ownership. 
 
3.3 Foreign directors 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) describe two ways of approaching the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system for non-Anglo-American firms. The first being to cross-list the 
firm stock on an Anglo-American foreign exchange listing and the second being to include an 
outsider Anglo-American foreign board member in the firm. These ways are assumed to 
create value is by breaking away from a partly segmented market2 in which information 
asymmetries and/or legal barriers constitute obstacles for domestic firms. Firms based in 
partly segmented markets have a restricted access to shareholders which makes an equity 
issue here expensive (Oxelheim, et al., 1998). 
 
Studies on the first factor have shown that cross listing for foreign firms on the U.S. stock 
exchange have yielded cumulative abnormal returns, meaning a positive effect on the stock 
                                                 
2 A segmented market is defined as ”A market that is partially or wholly isolated from other markets by one or 
more market imperfections” (Harvey & R, 2011) 
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price on the time of listing and thus a lower cost of capital for the firm (Sundaram & Logue, 
1996; Foerster & Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999). 
  
Cross listing of firms enables foreign shareholders to buy a large share of the firm stocks. A 
large shareholder from the foreign country can afford more active monitoring for example by 
placing members on the board, mainly outsider directors, while a smaller shareholder might 
not be able to afford this (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Even though larger foreign shareholders 
tend to use their power as to obtain benefits that do not accrue to smaller shareholders, these 
negative effects are mitigated by the fact that large foreign shareholders are ”outsiders” and 
can therefore perform their monitoring duty in a more unbiased way (Stulz, 1999).  
 
Furthermore, cross-listing on foreign markets enables the firm to take advantage of 
shareholders buying a large stake in the company and provides a monitoring effect, while not 
being that active in the voting process and also being at an “arm’s length” regarding 
management compensation and thus increasing the value of the firm (Stulz, 1999). 
  
Reese & Weisbach, (2002) shows that cross-listing has been proven to provide increased 
minority interest protection by employing the stricter US GAAP rules. This means that the 
action of trying to extract private benefits will be more costly for the managers and thus 
protects minority shareholders which normally do not have any power to change the 
managers’ behavior.  
 
For firms not having the funds to complete a foreign listing, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
discuss the possibility of having a foreign director from a more demanding corporate 
governance system to “signal its willingness to improve the monitoring opportunities by 
including foreign outsider members on the board” (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003, p. 2372). They 
further argue that the board becomes more active and more independent from management by 
including one or more outside Anglo-American board members. Finally they add that 
including at least one outside Anglo-American board member “strengthens investor 
confidence, and this signal will eventually lead to an increase in firm value”. Their results 
show that there is a positive effect of having an Anglo-American outsider on the corporate 
board and are discussed to stem from that the company signals a willingness to change 
towards the Anglo-American corporate governance system (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). The 
effects were especially apparent in firms that are older, larger and also in specific industries 
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such as the manufacturing, IT and Telecom sectors (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). 
 
However a study made on U.S. firms by Masulis et al. (2012) shows opposite results. Firms 
with foreign independent directors (FIDs) displayed significantly poorer results than firms 
without, especially as the firms’ business presence in the country the foreign director resided 
in lessened. The reason suggested for this was the amount of board meetings not being 
attended by FIDs because of long travel times. The authors concluded that by extension, this 
lead to the board member having less time to perform monitoring activities.  
 
A key difference between these studies are the definition of “foreign independent director” 
and “outsider Anglo-American board member”. Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) defines their 
outside director as born “Anglo-American” while Masulis et al. (2012) defines foreign 
independent directors (FDI) as living in another country. This meaning that the birth place of 
the director does not matter as a FDI can be a U.S. citizen living abroad. Similar for both 
studies is that they both focus on outside directors. In the study performed by Masulis et al. 
(2012) the placing is also chosen to be in the U.S., a country well known to be using an 
Anglo-American corporate governance system (Tricker, 2012). This means that the effects 
Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) were looking for might not appear since including foreign 
investors will provide no signaling effects of moving towards a more demanding corporate 
governance system.  
 
Eberhart (2012) shows that firms which are adopting the stricter “committee” corporate 
governance system do perform better than other firms in Japan. This may also indicate that 
including foreign directors which signals a move towards a stricter corporate governance 
system may increase value for a firm. 
 
One possible negative factor of having foreigners on the board is the “silent board” effect. 
Because having Anglo-Americans on the board often calls for having English as the 
discussion language, members of the board that are not comfortable with speaking English 
often feel uneasy speaking up their opinion at board meetings, resulting in a “silent board” 
(Piekkari, et al., 2015). This effect was found to be significant amongst the board members 
that were not part of the executive group in a sample of Nordic firms (Piekkari, et al., 2015).  
 
The author of this thesis suggest that this factor will also affect the results because of the 
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larger difference in language between Japanese and English, than between the Nordic 
languages and English and may possible mitigate the result of having foreigners on the board. 
However, this variable is hard to measure since interviews need to be conducted in order to 
understand how comfortable board members are with the use English. 
 
To summarize, the effects of foreign directors on performance have not yet been widely 
researched and studies from different regions and with different definitions of foreign 
directors show different results. Despite this, the author establishes the second hypothesis 
based mainly around Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) since this study will use a similar definition 
of outside Anglo-American board member as well a country with a non-Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. 
 
The thesis second hypothesis is:  
Japanese firms with one or more outside Anglo-American directors have higher firm 
performance than firms without such directors. 
 
3.4 Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 Japanese firms with a higher share of foreign ownership have higher firm 
performance than firms with lower share of foreign ownership. 
 
Hypothesis 2 Japanese firms with one or more outside Anglo-American directors have 
higher firm performance than firms without such directors. 
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4. Methodology and data collection 
This section provides the type of data, sources and definition of variables used to answer the 
research questions. The motivation for the chosen regression specification is further 
explained and lastly the assumptions for the ordinary least square model and the quality of 
research design are discussed in context of the chosen methodology. 
 
4.1 Research approach 
This study will use deductive methodology for answering the research questions. This is 
achieved by following existing theory from which hypotheses are deduced and later tested 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). Collected data will be tested against the hypotheses using a panel 
least squares estimation in which the hypotheses will be either accepted or rejected.  
 
4.2 Data selection 
Using quantitative research design and more specifically a panel data OLS regression, a 
sample of the 250 largest firms3 from the Tokyo Stock Exchange will be analyzed. The 
number 250 is relatively large, considering variables which has to be extracted manually from 
corporate governance reports, but fewer observations may leave the sample with too few 
observations for the inclusion of foreign directors, making it difficult to perform a regression 
analysis. The reason a larger sample size was not selected is because of the problem with data 
reliability related to the number of non-answered fields increasing in the financial software 
after the 250 firm mark. Johansson & Sawaguchi (2009) uses a similar sample size for their 
panel data regression on corporate governance traits in Japanese firms, further suggesting that 
data is available and that regressions can be performed. 
 
Financial, Banking and Insurance firms are all excluded from the sample because the way that 
accounting are performed within this sector differ from other industries and if they would be 
included, the firm performance measurements could become biased. 
 
The time period of the sample will be year 2010-2013, as presented earlier. All firms included 
in the sample have been listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange during all years. The time period 
is chosen to reflect the most recent developments and get a good sample range for the panel 
                                                 
3 Based on average net sales 2010-2013 
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data. However, the limit for free corporate governance data on the Tokyo stock exchange 
homepage is 5 years back and the performance data was only fully available 2 years back 
from today. Therefore 2010-2013 were selected as the sample years for this study. 
 
4.3 Data collection 
All data in this study can be classified as secondary data and is collected through the use of 
both financial software, corporate governance reports and year-end securities reports. The 
financial variables are extracted using the software: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
 
Corporate governance variables are mainly collected from the Tokyo Stock Exchange web 
page in which there are t-5 years of public information available through reports. These 
reports contain data with the names and history of the outside board members, number of 
independent board members, the size of the board and the ownership percentage of the ten 
largest shareholders (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2015). The latest report of each year is chosen, 
representing the board configuration at the end of the year.  
 
The Foreign Ownership factor for firm performance in which data will be collected from 
Edinet (Financial Services Agency, 2015), were year-end securities report for each of the 
firms are published. The only disadvantage with these reports is that they are only from one 
point in time, producing no average foreign shareholdings during the year. However, since all 
firms are measured under the same circumstances, this point in time measure will represent 
the foreign ownership level during that year. This way of collecting foreign ownership data 
further goes in line with Johansson & Sawaguchi (2009). The corporate governance variables 
and foreign ownership variable are collected in Japanese and translated by the author.   
 
4.4 Model specification 
For this thesis, the author will utilize panel data to investigate the research questions. In short, 
panel data is composed of information in both the cross sectional dimension and time 
dimension. Also, it follows the same cross sectional units during the whole sample period, 
which in this study means that the same chosen firms will be observed during each year of 
sample period.  
 
This structure makes panel data beneficial, compared with standard time series or cross-
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sectional data in many ways. First, it is possible to investigate and tackle more complex issues 
because of the well provided data. One example is that the increased number of observations 
provides more degrees of freedom for hypothesis testing which is especially apparent when 
variables are examined over time. Secondly, employing the right structure for the panel data 
can help to combat certain endogeneity problems (Brooks, 2008) which will be discussed 
further in section 4.7.4.  
 
The simplest form of panel data regression is referred to as a pooled regression (Brooks, 
2008). In this model it is assumed that all observations are stacked together and estimated as 
performed in a normal OLS regression (Brooks, 2008). This model is easy to estimate but 
ignores the aspect of movements within the cross sectional units, as well as the movements 
over time. This can be solved by estimating separate OLS regressions for each time period 
and cross sectional unit. However, since this this does not take the common structure of the 
panel data into account, a lot of useful data will go to waste.  
 
In order to take the cross sectional and period movements into account, it is possible to model 
the data using fixed effects which can be applied in either the cross-sectional or time-
dimension. Cross sectional fixed affects basically allows the intercept to vary cross-
sectionally, but not over time and all slope estimates are fixed both cross-sectionally and over 
time (Brooks, 2008). For time-fixed effects, the intercepts are allowed to vary over time but 
locked in the cross-section dimension (Brooks, 2008). Same as for the cross-sectional fixed 
effects, all slope estimates are fixed in both the time and cross-sectional dimension. Below the 
regression notation from a panel data model with cross-section fixed effects is presented. 
 
Equation 4.4.1 Example of panel data regression with cross-sectional fixed effects 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
The common denominator for the fixed effect models is that you can interpret the models as 
dummy variable regression, with values on the dummies taking on 1 for the matching firm 
and zero for non-matching firms. The coefficients on in front of the dummies are estimated 
through the Least Squares Dummy Variable or LSDV. To take the above regression as an 
example, 𝜇𝑖 are expanded, adding one dummy variable per firm with a constant to be 
estimated. The notation can thus be rewritten as the example regression below.  
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Equation 4.4.2 Example of the LSDV regression with Cross-sectional fixed effects 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇1𝐷1 + 𝜇2𝐷2 +  𝜇3𝐷3 + ⋯ + 𝜇𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
 
The notation of time-fixed effects work exactly as above, only that the 𝜇𝑖 is switched out with 
λ𝑡 and where dummies for each of the periods are applied. 
 
If these two methods are combined into one, it is often referred to as “two-way error 
component model” which essentially adds both the dummies for the cross-sectional and time-
effects models (Brooks, 2008). 
 
Equation 4.4.3 Example of the two-way error component model 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + λ𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
Equation 4.4.4 Example of the two-way error component model in LSDV regression form  
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + λ1𝐷1 + λ2𝐷2 + λ3𝐷3 + ⋯ + λ𝑁𝐷𝑁 +  𝜇1𝐷1 +  𝜇2𝐷2 +  𝜇3𝐷3 + ⋯ +  𝜇𝑁𝐷𝑁𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
 
The specification for this study will employ the two-way error component model. This is in 
line with the specification Nakano & Nguyen (2013) used to examine the performance gain 
from foreign ownership. The panel data regression for this thesis is provided below, in which 
λ𝑡 and 𝜇𝑖 represents the firm-fixed, and time-fixed effects. 
 
Equation 4.4.5 Notation of the regression model in this study 
 
𝐿𝑁𝑄𝑖,𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
=  α1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑜 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3
∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6
∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  λ𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖
+  𝑣 𝑖,𝑡4 
                                                 
4 Explanations of the variables in the regression follows in 4.6 
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First off, the reasoning for using firm-fixed effects are that there might exist heterogeneity 
between firms, not only in differing industries but also between firms in the same industry. 
Firms which possess unique technologies or other special traits might have performance 
boosts (or drops) which are higher than for firms without. In a regular pooled regression, these 
factors are usually not taken into consideration and the effect they provide might end up 
boosting or mitigating the variables which the study is examining which is usually referred to 
as an omitted variable bias (Brooks, 2008). Nakano & Nguyen (2013) uses an example in 
which foreign investors might look specifically for these technological or unique advances for 
deciding where to invest. The author of this thesis further suggests that the same reasoning 
can be applied in the foreign director variable. Factors could be anything from the company 
culture being more geared towards an international environment to that one of the firm’s 
unique characteristics calls for overseas expertise in form of a foreign director. This means 
that if these firm effects are not accounted for, the effects they have might instead end up in 
the foreign board member or foreign ownership variables, leading to an omitted variable bias.  
 
One limitation for the firm fixed-effects model is that it assumes that the unique firm traits 
remain constant over the entire measurement period. This can pose a problem if the study 
examines a fast growing industry where for example new technological breakthroughs or 
changes in firm organization can change these characteristics at a fast rate (Nakano & 
Nguyen, 2013). However, since this thesis examines a broad spectrum of industries, and a 
relatively short time spectrum, the firm fixed effect model seems to be a viable option. The 
method of using firm fixed effects in studies which tests ownership and performance is further 
recommended by Himmelberg, et al. (1999). The explanation for using time-fixed effects is 
simpler. Because each period of the sample might pose effects which affects all firms likely, 
such as changes in interest rates or tax laws, the author suggests that this aspect needs to be 
accounted for in this study as well. One of the reasons for this is the implementation of the 
Abenomics-program which in 2013 started to use quantitative financial easing programs to 
among others, combat deflation and lower unemployment (Bank of Japan, 2013). Other 
reasons that can be discussed to justify the use time fixed effects is the earthquake that hit 
Japan in 2011, as well as the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2010 and 2011.  
 
Testing for which specification that is most suitable for this regression is carried out in section 
5.6 using redundant fixed effects- and Hausman- tests.   
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4.5 Measurements for firm performance 
In line with Nakano & Nguyen (2013) and Masulis et al. (2012) two measurements for 
performance will be used in this study: Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
 
Tobin’s Q is the market value divided by total assets. This is a ratio between the firms’ assets’ 
market value and their replacement value, making a good measurement to determine if the 
firms’ stock is overvalued or undervalued by the market. Return on assets on the other hand 
measures operating income over total assets. This gives an idea on how effective management 
is at using its assets to generate earnings. 
 
Datastream utilizes this calculation for retrieving Tobin’s Q: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
 
And this calculation for Return on Assets: 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 – 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 + ((𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡−𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑) ∗ (1−𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)) 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟′𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟’𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗ 100
  
 
In the application as a firm-performance measurement Tobin’s Q and ROA has been criticized 
in that underinvestment from entrenched actually increases the denominator and thus poses an 
endogeneity problem (Dybvig & Warachka, 2010). Another problem posed for both ROA and 
Tobin’s Q is that they vary, depending on what industry is used. This study will still include 
both measurements since it examines an average on all industries except the financial. 
Furthermore, the use of these measurements makes comparison with previous studies simpler, 
since one or both of these measurements are used in all of firm performance studies this thesis 
is referring to.  
 
4.6 Definition of variables 
A review of the regression is presented to shed light on its components. 
 
Equation 4.6.1 Review of the regression used in this study 
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𝐿𝑁𝑄𝑖,𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
=  α1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑜 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3
∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6
∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  λ𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖
+  𝑣 𝑖,𝑡 
 
4.6.1 Dependent variables 
For the both research questions, the dependent variables in the regressions are composed of 
LNQ and ROA. LN is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and is used to reduce possible 
heteroscedasticity and to reduce the effect of outliners in the sample. Since the ROA variable 
includes negative numbers, a natural logarithm of ROA would greatly reduce the sample size. 
Because of this, the normal version of ROA is used, in line with Nakano & Nguyen (2013) 
and Masulis et al. (2012). 
 
4.6.2 Independent variables 
For the first research question, the independent variables are: Outside Anglo-American board 
member (abbreviated to OAABM in the regression) and Foreign Ownership. The first variable 
includes all outsider directors which have a citizenship or has had a citizenship in the U.S. or 
U.K. / Commonwealth countries. A board member is considered an outsider if they are not 
employed or are indirectly employed by the firm. If the firm observation fulfill these 
requirements the variable will take on a value of 1, if not it will take on a value of 0. The 
reason being in line with Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) that the proposed signaling effect from 
Anglo-American outside directors will take place, regardless of how many foreign directors 
which are included. Data for this variable is extracted from the latest corporate governance 
report from each company, for each year, meaning that the outside Anglo-American board 
members inclusion is examined at the end of each year. Foreign ownership is the percent of 
shares controlled by foreign owners which are not individual investors at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
 
4.6.2.1 Foreign corporate governance control variable 
The control variable used are: Foreign Subsidiary is a dummy variable taking on the value of 
1 if 20 percent or more of all types of shares are owned by one foreign industrial owner, 0 if 
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not. This is to control that the effects board members might contribute to firm value, does not 
originate from the strategic holdings of a parent company, a so called foreign direct 
investments. Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) uses the 20% because of the relatively strong 
minority shareholder ownership rights in the Nordic countries. Since Japan also has relatively 
strong minority shareholder rights, low barriers for being the controlling shareholder (La 
porta, et al., 2002) and for comparability with earlier studies, this study also employs 20% as 
the level for this variable.  
 
4.6.2.2 Corporate governance control variables 
As stated in the theory section, it is known that the size of the board and the independence of 
the board are general traits that are affected when changing corporate governance system. 
However, since earlier studies has indicated that changing these variables can boost 
performance of firms (Eberhart, 2012) as well as being just a change made on paper 
(Buchanan, 2009), it is needed to control for these variables when performing the regression. 
Board Size is the amount of members of the corporate board, and Board Independence is the 
share of independent outside directors, relative to the board size. The data for these variables 
are extracted from the latest corporate governance report of each year, meaning the board 
composition the firm uses at the end of each year. 
 
4.6.2.3 General control variables 
Since it is more common to recruit foreign directors in the largest 30 companies on the Tokyo 
stock exchange (Fujishima, 2009), the size of each firm needs to be controlled for. The Ln Net 
Sales variable represents the natural logarithm firms’ net sales for each of the years. Previous 
studies has further found that the age of a firm can affect firm performance e.g. Loderer & 
Waelchli (2011) which encourages the author to control for both firm size and firm age. Ln 
Firm Age denotes the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was founded 
measured from each year in the data set. Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) established that firms 
which are older and larger show increased benefits from including outsider Anglo-American 
board members, which further suggests that these variables can impact the results if not 
controlled for. 
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4.7 Assumptions for the ordinary least squares method 
In order to be able to use the ordinary least squares estimation for the regression there are 
some assumptions which must hold to be able to generate accurate results. These assumptions 
will be presented and discussed in the context of this study below. 
 
4.7.1 E(ut) = 0 
The first assumption relies on that the mean for the error terms must be zero. This problem is 
solved by including an intercept in the regression (Brooks, 2008). 
 
4.7.2 var(u
t
)=σ2< ∞ 
One of the assumptions for the OLS-estimator is that the residuals should have a constant 
variance. (Brooks, 2008). This is referred to as homoscedasticity and if this relationship is 
broken, it is called heteroscedasticity. If problems with heteroscedasticity is left uncontrolled, 
it could lead to that the standard errors for the slope will be inaccurate (Brooks, 2008). A 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for detecting heteroscedasticity is carried out and the results are 
presented in section 5.5.2.  
 
4.7.3 cov(uj,uj) = 0 
If this assumption does not hold it means that the error terms are correlated over time or cross-
sectionally and are usually referred to as autocorrelation or serial-correlation (Brooks, 2008). 
If autocorrelation are left un-checked, the regression’s beta- coefficients will become 
inefficient, and can be interpreted incorrectly. However, since autocorrelation is most 
prominent in time-series data (Brooks, 2008), and since this sample only uses four years of 
data, it will be difficult to see a trend in the error terms and therefore no test for 
autocorrelation will be applied. 
 
4.7.4 cov(uj,xj) = 0 
When correlation exists between independent variable(s) and the error term in the regression 
the problem is often referred to as endogeneity (Brooks, 2008). As noted earlier, this study 
helps solve some of the omitted-variable endogeneity problem by applying fixed effects in 
both the firm and time dimension. Another form of endogeneity that becomes especially 
apparent when including corporate governance variables, is measurement error. However, 
depending on the way variables in the regression are interpreted, some of this endogeneity can 
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be mitigated. A corporate governance variable such as board independence are only a variable 
that acts as a proxy for how independent the board is. In reality it only measures how big 
share of the board members that are entered as independent, but measuring the real qualitative 
variable of board independence is almost impossible. Tobin’s Q further uses the book value of 
debt rather than market value in its calculation, meaning that it only serves as a proxy for 
reality. Because of factors such as these, extra caution must be taken when interpreting results 
from the regression.   
 
Another problem that might affect the results of studies like this thesis is simultaneity, 
stemming from that the fixed-effects estimator is not well suited for the sample data at hand. 
Since the firm-fixed effects can contain information which affects both firm performance and 
the independent variables over time, the assumption that they are time-invariant might be 
wrong (Nakano & Nguyen, 2013). However, in order to control fully for this problem, a large 
array of exogenous instrumental variables are usually needed. Given that the requirements for 
being exogenous is that the instruments should not be correlated with firm performance (the 
dependent variable) but be correlated with the assumed endogenous variables, it is hard to 
find suitable candidates. Nakano & Nguyen (2013) underlines this in a Japanese context, 
explaining that there has been no real changes to laws concerning foreign shareholdings in 
Japan or any attempts to liberalize or restrict laws from the origin countries of the investors 
towards Japan. It will thus be even harder to find exogenous variables that are correlated both 
with the Anglo American board membership and foreign ownership variables, while not 
affecting firm performance. Nakano & Nguyen (2013) continues by applying lagged versions 
of the already existing independent variables as instruments and utilizing a dynamic panel 
model regression. However, they state that the reason they are choosing to apply this model is 
both because they are investigating only the electronics industry, which characterized by fast 
technological growth, and that their sample span over a relatively long period (13 years). This 
being because the assumption of firm-fixed effects being constant over time does not hold 
without the use of instrumental variables. Conversely, the sample period used in this study is 
much shorter (4 years), while exhibiting firms from a variety of industries, making it less 
probable of breaking the assumption imposed by the firm-fixed effects model and in the end 
overestimate the effect of the independent variables, meaning that IV’s will not be applied to 
control for simultaneity. 
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4.7.5 (Ut ~ N(0, σ2))  
The next assumption is that the residuals are normally distributed, which they are normally 
not when it comes to panel data (Brooks, 2008). Panel data does however usually consist of 
an adequate number of observations, meaning that the normality assumption becomes less 
relevant. Nevertheless, a Jarque-Bera test is carried and presented in chapter 5 to see whether 
the residuals are normally distributed or not. 
 
4.8 Other problems in OLS regressions 
 
4.8.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity means that a high correlation exists between the independent variables 
(Brooks, 2008). If such problems persist while applying the OLS estimator, the r-squared will 
be high, standard errors on the variables low, but the independent variables will not be 
significant. Furthermore, if small changes are made in the regression specification, it will lead 
to large changes in the estimator output. Lastly, a high multicollinearity leads to that the 
confidence intervals for the parameters get larger, and in turn makes it harder to draw 
conclusions in the regression. Since it is difficult to detect multicollinearity, a simple 
correlation matrix is constructed and the correlations of the independent variables are noted. 
The results and discussion from this is presented in chapter 5.   
 
4.9 Quality of research design 
Yin (2014) describes four different criteria that are used when evaluating the quality of the 
research design. The criteria presented are: construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability. These will be discussed below in the context of this study. 
 
Construct Validity 
 
This criteria refers to that adequate measurements are used for the research questions. For this 
study, foreign directors and foreign ownership are used as measurements for the degree of 
firm internationalization in a corporate governance aspects. While these two variables may 
not represent every form of internationalization in corporate governance, the author deem 
them to worthy to be used as proxies. This is supported by theory, indicating a connection 
between the variables and the degree of convergence with the Anglo-American corporate 
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governance system. This in turn would suggest a more international corporate governance 
model. 
 
Internal Validity 
 
Internal validity refers to the casual direction between variables in the regression. Even 
though the fixed-effects specification helps combat problems related to simultaneity, there are 
still ways which the causality direction of the variables could be strengthened for this study. 
This could be performed by obtaining an exogenous set of instrumental variables, but as 
discussed in section 4.6.5. Endogeneity, finding such variables in the current specification are 
deemed to be difficult, and not performed in this study. To sum up, the internal validity of this 
study is determined to be fair. 
 
External Validity 
 
This criteria is used to evaluate if the findings from the study are generalizable outside the 
study sample. Because of the unique characteristics of Japanese corporate governance, it 
might be difficult to generalize these findings for other countries. However, the author 
suggests the findings to be generalizable to other firms, listed firms on the first section of the 
Tokyo stock exchange, mainly because of firm size, and age being controlled for, as well as 
the use of firm fixed effects in the sample. Therefore the external validity is regarded to be 
moderate. 
 
Reliability 
 
Reliability essentially is a criteria to measure if it is possible to replicate the study and 
produce the same results again. This criteria is imposed to decrease the risk of errors and 
biases in studies. Since all the names of the firms are included in appendix 1, Table 1.1 “List 
of firms”, and the regression analysis methodology is clearly documented, the reliability is 
deemed high for this study. Furthermore, the data are collected from a well-recognized 
software as well as publicly available corporate governance reports, meaning that the data 
collection could be performed again, yielding a high reliability for the study.  
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5. Empirical findings 
In this section, the descriptive statistics for the sample, as well as the regression results will 
be presented. The hypotheses, formed in the theory section will either be accepted or rejected. 
Finally, the results from the OLS-validity tests and the tests for fixed and random effects will 
be conferred.  
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean  Median Max Min  Std. 
Dev. 
Observations 
LNQ -0.62 -0.52  1.02 -4.34  0.58 998 
ROA  2.42  2.28  13.23 -22.64  3.31 996 
OAABM  0.04  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.20 998 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP  0.23  0.22  0.72  0.00  0.12 999 
FOREIGN_SUBSIDIARY  0.02  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.12 1000 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE  0.13  0.09  0.87  0.00  0.15 998 
BOARD_SIZE  11.36  11.00  28.00  3.00  3.93 998 
LN_FIRM_AGE  4.08  4.22  5.34  0.00  0.72 992 
LN_NET_SALES  20.76  20.64  23.82  19.35  0.80 1000 
 
The sample is composed of 250 firms during the years 2010 to 2013, yielding roughly 1000 
observations for each variables. The Anglo-American dummy variable has a mean of 0.04, 
meaning that around 4% of the firms in the sample includes one or more outsider Anglo-
American board members. The average level of foreign shareholdings for the sample are at 
23%. It can further be observed that the average board size lies at 11 individuals but that the 
standard deviation from this is relatively high, with the largest board having 28 members, and 
the smallest just 3 members. Board independence has a mean of 13%, confirming that 
Japanese companies has a smaller share of independent board members than on American 
British boards (Muller-Kahle, et al., 2014).  
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5.2 Regression results 
Table 5.2 Regression results 
Variable LNQ Probability ROA Probability 
OAABM 0.188*** 0.000 -0.47 0.635 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP 0.703** 0.013 10.911*** 0.000 
FOREIGN_SUBSIDIARY 0.319*** 0.000 7.787*** 0.002 
BOARD_SIZE -0.053 0.685 2.02 0.188 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 0.014*** 0.008 0.05 0.299 
LN_FIRM_AGE 0.042 0.728 4.211*** 0.008 
LN_NET_SALES 0.130 0.253 6.306*** 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.891  0.574  
F-statistic 32.517***  6.163***  
Probability 0.000  0.000  
 
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
The adjusted r-squared for the regressions are at a high 89.1% respectively 57.4%. This can 
be interpreted as that the regressions are good at explaining the variations in the dependent 
variable (Brooks, 2008). Previous studies yielded 30% in Adjusted R-squared for Sugai et al. 
(2008), 37.1 % (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003) and 79.7% for Masulis et al.’s (2012) Tobin’s Q 
regression. The high degree of explanation can be attributed to the inclusion of fixed effects in 
the regression. Masulis et al (2012) performs both a standard OLS regression and a panel data 
regression with firm fixed effects. The first yielded 41.2% in adjusted R-squared while the 
latter showed an adjusted R-squared of 79.7%. This means that even though the R-squared 
looks suspiciously high in the Tobin’s Q regression, previous studies also show similar 
degrees of explanation. Amongst the independent variables, there are multiple variables that 
are shown to affect firm performance. The F-statistic indicates if the variables used in the 
regression are jointly significant or not. In both cases this statistic is significance at the 1% 
level meaning that the variables used are jointly significant.  
 
5.3 Hypotheses acceptance or rejection 
 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
Foreign ownership has a positive effect on firm performance and is positively significant at 
the 5% level in the Tobin’s Q regression and at the 1% level in the ROA regression. This 
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means that the first hypothesis, that Japanese firms with a higher share of foreign ownership 
have higher firm performance than firms with lower share of foreign ownership is accepted in 
both regressions. 
 
5.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
The inclusion of at least one outsider Anglo-American board member has a positive effect on 
firm performance is positive and significant at the 1% level when Tobin’s Q is used as a 
measure for firm performance. However, in the ROA regression, the effect is very far from 
being significant, meaning that no positive effect is observed. Therefore the second 
hypothesis, that Japanese firms with one or more outside Anglo-American directors have 
higher firm performance than firms without such directors, is accepted in the Tobin’s Q 
regression, but rejected in the ROA regression. 
 
5.4 Control variables  
Foreign subsidiary: The dummy variable that takes on the value of one if 20% or more of the 
firm’s shares are controlled by a single foreign industrial owner shows a positive, significant 
effect on 1 % level in both regressions. 
 
Board size: The number of board members does not show any significant results in any of the 
regressions, meaning that we can’t draw any conclusions for this variable. 
 
Board independence: The share of independent board members has a significant positive 
effect in the Tobin’s Q regression at 1% while showing no clear results in the ROA regression 
due to poor significance.    
 
Firm age: The natural logarithm of how many years that has passed since the firm were 
founded shows no clear results in the Tobin’s Q regression due to poor significance. However 
when ROA is used as the dependent variable, a clear positive significant effect is observed at 
the 1% level.  
 
Net sales: Firm size, being explained by the natural logarithm of the firms’ net sales is 
positive but show no significance when Tobin’s Q is being used as the dependent variable. In 
the ROA regression a positive and significant effect is observed at the 1% level. 
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5.5 Validity tests results 
As described in the methodology, a number of assumptions has to hold true in order to get 
reliable results from the OLS regression. In this chapter the results from the performed test 
will be presented and discussed.  
 
5.5.1 Multicollinearity detection 
(See Appendix 2, Table 2.1.1) 
As can be seen in the table, the samples correlations ranging between 0.32 and -0.2, which 
means the sample should not suffer from any problems stemming from multicollinearity in 
this study.    
 
5.5.2 Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 
(See appendix 3, Table 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) 
In order to check for heteroscedasticity the residuals from the regression are extracted, 
squared and regressed against the independents variables again. This test is known as the 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test (Brooks, 2008). In short, if the F-statistic for the test is 
significant it indicates that the sample contains heteroscedasticity. For the Tobin’s Q 
regression, the F-statistic is significant at the 5% level, meaning that the residual variance is 
non-constant in the independent variables. Since both firm-fixed and period fixed effects are 
being used, a white diagonal is added to the original regression. With the White diagonal 
standard errors & covariance being used, the significance for the two main variables increases 
slightly. Otherwise no major changes are detected. For the regression with ROA as the 
dependent variable, no heteroscedasticity problems are detected. 
 
5.5.3 Violation of normality detection  
(See appendix 5 figure 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) 
As can be seen in the two figures, the residuals from the two regressions does are both 
significant at 1 % levels in the Jarque-Bera tests meaning that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. However, a normal distributed shape can be recognized from the histogram. As 
discussed in the methodology section, the assumption of having normally distributed residuals 
is not imperative when using panel data.  
 
40 
  
5.6 Fixed or random-effects specification testing 
 
5.6.1 Redundant fixed effects tests  
(see appendix 4, tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2) 
In order to determine whether a standard, pooled regression is a viable model for this thesis’s 
specification, redundant fixed effects likelihood ratio tests are carried out (Brooks, 2008). The 
F-tests uses three different tests. The first is restricting the cross-section fixed effects to zero, 
the second is to restrict the period fixed effects to zero and the third restricts both types of 
fixed effects to zero. The test for both the Tobin’s Q and the ROA regression shows that these 
three restrictions is not in line with the data at hand and thus indicating that the pooled 
regression model cannot be applied.  
 
5.6.2 Hausman test for random effects 
(See appendix 4, tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2) 
After it was established that a pooled regression could not be used, a Hausman test is applied 
to check whether fixed or random effects are most suitable for our sample (Brooks, 2008). 
This test essentially tests if the random effects, applied are uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variable, which is a requirement for using random effects in the regression. However, since 
the p-value for the Hausman test basically is zero in both tests, correlation exists and fixed 
effects are deemed to be most suitable in the regression. Random effects cannot be applied in 
the time dimension due to the number of independent variables used.  
41 
  
6. Analysis  
In this chapter, the results will be analyzed and compared to findings from previous studies. 
The theoretical background will be used to further analyze the results and connect the 
findings of this study with theory.  
 
6.1 Foreign directors’ effect on firm performance 
Since the Tobin’s Q regression showed positive results while the ROA regression did not 
show any significant results, the definition of performance is suggested to have an impact on 
the outcome. Tobin’s Q essentially measures the market value the firm compared to the firms 
total assets. Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) discusses the possibility of that by including foreign 
directors, a form of signaling effect that the firm is about to change its corporate governance 
system towards the Anglo-American system can be observed. This suggests that the signaling 
effects may be captured better using Tobin’s Q, since it includes the current market value of 
the firm in its calculation. Therefore changes in the stock’s price related to the possible 
signaling effects from the foreign directors can be captured instantly. ROA on the other hand 
measures the operating results of the firm, suggesting that positive effects from including a 
foreign board member might not become apparent as quickly as in the Tobin’s Q regression.  
 
This study shares its positive results in Tobin’s Q with the ones in Oxelheim & Randøy 
(2003) and Sugai et al. (2008). Even though Sugai et al. (2008) included outside foreign board 
members from all foreign countries in their sample it is interesting to see that the results apply 
when concentrating only on the Anglo-American board members as well. Since Sugai et al. 
(2008) used the percentage of foreigners as their main explanatory variable, the results they 
get in Tobin’s Q (0.0144) is difficult to put in contrast with this study. If this study’s results 
are compared with Oxelheim & Randøy, (2003), the level of gain in LNQ from including a 
foreign director for this study lands at 0.188 which is slightly higher than Oxelheim & 
Randøy, (2003) who produced 0.148 gain in LNQ in their OLS regression. A reason that 
supports higher results in a Japanese environment could be that the signaling effects from 
including a foreign board member is larger in Japan than in Sweden or Norway. This would in 
turn mean that the act of including a foreign director in Japan could be seen by the market to 
be a very unique and maybe even bold move thus yielding an increased signaling effect. The 
argumentation for this could be that many Japanese firms still fits in the traditional Japanese 
corporate governance system model and that foreign board members are still considered 
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somewhat of rarity in Japan. It is also possible that the knowledge the foreign board members 
bring to the firm has a direct effect on firm performance, especially if the Japanese firm are 
active in same region as the foreign director is based. This could mean, that the Japanese 
firms in the sample gained more from this effect than the Nordic firms, maybe because of 
wider cultural differences being able to be mitigated by a foreign director from the region the 
Japanese firm is active in. Furthermore, increased monitoring effects of the firm’s 
management may also be one of the reasons for the increased effects on Tobin’s Q from 
foreign directors. 
 
The results from this thesis are further compared with results from the U.S. sample from 
Masulis et al. (2012). This thesis shows a larger Tobin’s Q than for the U.S. sample, in which 
foreign independent directors affects Tobin’s Q at -0.144 in the OLS regression. The author 
suggests that this difference can be attributed to that including foreign directors in U.S. firms, 
does not signal a move towards a more efficient corporate governance system in the same 
sense as it would in the Japan or the Nordic region. This part of the positive effect could thus 
have been mitigated in Masulis et al.’s (2012) sample, and may explain some of the difference 
in the results when compared to this thesis. Masulis et al. (2012) further concludes that the 
firm performance boost that foreign directors are suggested to add, largely dissipates when 
companies are relocating their activities from the origin country of the foreign director. This 
suggests, that the knowledge effect that foreign directors bring of overseas markets might be 
the only value adding effect in an U.S. context. Therefore the by Masulis et al. (2012) 
suggested decreased firm performance the company incurs related to missed meetings from 
faraway foreign directors might be greater than the positive knowledge effects that they might 
add. These travel times and missed meetings should also be a factor in a Japanese context, 
mainly because of the lack of Anglo-American countries in Japan’s near vicinity. However, 
they are not large enough to make foreign directors affect Tobin’s Q negatively in this study. 
 
Another way in which foreign directors were thought to affect firm performance unfavorably 
is the problem of language differences, shown to have a negative on firm performance in the 
Nordic region (Piekkari, et al., 2015). This effect should also exist in Japanese firms. 
However, when examining the details of the foreign directors in order to acquire their 
nationality, many were stated to be fluent Japanese speakers. Because of the average poor 
English-speaking level of Japanese people (TOEFL, 2013) it may be possible that, unlike the 
Nordic region, some of the foreign directors are forced to speak the target language of the 
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country they are employed in to make themselves understood. This in turn, would contribute 
less to the “silent board” effect, because the majority of the board is able to use the language 
they are most comfortable with.  
 
In this sample, there were only nine outside Anglo-American board members in the year of 
2010 while being 16 in 2013, suggesting an increase in the popularity of recruiting outside 
Anglo-American board members over time in this sample.  
 
In the correlation matrix in Appendix 2, table 2.1.1 it can be seen that the Anglo-American 
board member dummy variable is positively correlated to net sales at a 13% level suggesting 
that larger firms are more likely to include outsider board members. The board independence 
variable is positively correlated at 22%, foreign ownership at 19% and board size at 10%. The 
board independence correlation suggests that firms including outsider Anglo-American board 
members are more aware of the benefits from having independent board members, and thus 
employing a more Anglo-American style of corporate governance. The foreign ownership 
correlation could mean that firms with a high amount of foreign ownership are more likely to 
include outsider Anglo-American board members. The board size variable were thought to be 
correlated the other way, mainly because large boards are more prevalent in the traditional 
Japanese corporate governance system (Tricker, 2012) and firms including outside Anglo-
American board members are thought to signal a move towards the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. It has to be noted that the indications from the correlation 
matrix are limited and thus makes it difficult to draw any conclusions. It does however, 
provide interesting indications which can be used for further studies. 
 
6.2 Foreign ownership’s effect on firm performance 
According to the regression results, the foreign ownership variable has a positive effect on 
firm performance, both in the Tobin’s Q and ROA regression. This is in line with the results 
from Nakano & Nguyen (2013). The effect on firm performance is also much larger than from 
the outside Anglo-American board member variable. The reason for the high effect on firm 
performance could stem from many different factors, such as a pressure from foreign 
institutional investors to change corporate governance system towards a more Anglo-
American style system, like Aggarwal, et al. (2011) and Ahmadjian (2007) shows in their 
studies. It could also depend upon a higher degree of divestitures (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 
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2005), more corporate risk taking (Nguyen, 2012) or increased dividends (Baba, 2009) that 
are often associated with higher degrees of foreign ownership in Japan. The increased 
divestitures and increased risk taking are factors that could be the reason why foreign 
ownership affects ROA, unlike the foreign director variable. The author suggests that 
increasing divestitures could free up cash that later can inserted quickly into the operations. 
Furthermore, a higher level of risked taking can contribute directly to net income, increasing 
ROA. 
 
The amount of change in LNQ and ROA that foreign ownership constitutes are 0.703 and 
10.911 respectively. The positive results are well in line with previous studies. Nakano & 
Nguyen (2013) finds a 0.542 effect on LNQ, and only a 0.09 effect on ROA for the latest time 
period in their fixed effects sample. Ferris & Park (2005) results indicate a 6.51 change in 
Tobin’s Q or 1.87 in LNQ when observed in their fixed effects regression which is larger than 
in this sample. The main question to ask is why foreign ownership has such a large impact on 
ROA, compared with Tobin’s Q in this thesis’s results. As discussed earlier, it is suggested 
that ROA may be better at observing slightly delayed effects from the dependent variables. 
Since the data for foreign ownership only could be extracted at the end of each Japanese fiscal 
year, which for most firms ends in March, this would create a natural delayed effect for the 
dependent variable, and may be why so large results are being observed in ROA. 
 
This thesis’s results contradicts the findings of Phung & Le (2013) who report a decrease in 
firm performance of -0.565 in Tobin’s Q from foreign ownership in their fixed effects 
regression. The results are discussed to originate from the fact that their sample country, 
Vietnam is still an emerging market, were foreign ownership are low, divergent and does not 
have enough influence to perform adequate monitoring. Japan is like Vietnam in the aspect 
that an efficient corporate governance system is not yet adapted. However, in Japan it seems 
like the foreign investors have no problems performing sufficient monitoring, at least 
according to theory (Ahmadjian, 2007). The difference in results might originate from that 
Japan has already crossed the initial hurdle of the monitoring gap described by Stulz (1999) in 
which equity holders are responsible for the major part of firm-monitoring.  
 
In the correlation analysis in appendix 2, table 2.1.1, positive correlations between the foreign 
ownership variable and foreign subsidiary, board independence and firm size can be observed. 
The foreign subsidiary should be intuitively connected with the foreign subsidiary variable 
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since it is a measurement for firms with a high share of ownership from a foreign industrial 
actor. The board independence correlation could mean that foreign institutional investors have 
higher requirements for transparency or that the foreign owners actually change the board to 
allow for a higher share of independent directors. The firm size correlation could show that 
foreign investors are more prone to choose large firms as investment prospects. As discussed 
in the foreign director section, no concrete conclusions can be drawn from these correlations, 
since they are only indications of relationships. 
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7. Conclusion 
The conclusions drawn from answering the thesis’ research questions are presented. At the 
end, suggestions on further research are provided. 
 
The purpose of doing this study has been to establish whether internationalization has an 
effect on firm performance. This has been examined through testing two factors of 
internationalization: foreign ownership and the inclusion of foreign directors, empirically. The 
results have shown an overall positive effect for both foreign ownership and foreign directors, 
even though differences in the two firm performance measurements can be observed. The 
reason for the increased effects from including foreign board members are mainly discussed 
to stem from the signaling effects of the firm moving towards a new corporate governance 
model. It could also reflect the foreign directors’ knowledge of the regions the firm is active 
in. Lastly, it could also indicate increased monitoring effects that the foreign director provides 
when entering the company. The effects provided from foreign ownership are suggested to be 
rooted in the strategic change towards a more Anglo-American way of doing business which 
has been observed in the past in firms with high amounts of foreign ownership. Strategic 
changes include aspects such as increased risk taking, larger dividends and more of the firms’ 
unneeded assets being sold off. Changes from having a high degree of foreign ownership 
could also be attributed to the foreign investors increased requirements for monitoring effects 
and transparency. The answer to why foreign investors increase their holdings in Japanese 
firms could be that they see a potential in increasing the profits for the firms, and thus 
acquiring a higher return on investment.   
 
By using foreign ownership and foreign directors as measurements, it is indicated that firms 
which has internationalized their corporate governance systems performs better than their 
counterparts. The consequences for this could be substantial in Japan, during this day and age. 
For a country which is both facing problems with falling birthrates and a long term economic 
slump, internationalization of Japanese firms could provide the key for the Japanese economy 
recovering. This could in turn open up new markets, and provide new possibilities for Japan. 
However, as the data for this study indicates, there are still firms who refuse to change 
towards more transparency and monitoring of the management. If recent events continues on 
their course, we could see these firms being outperformed by more new thinking and open-
minded companies, who not only enjoy the benefits of getting rid of their old shackles, but 
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also gets access to large amounts of foreign investments, which in turn should raise their 
market value. 
 
Another dimension that has not been discussed in his thesis yet is the way adding a foreign 
board member could help the organization gain more diversity, which could further contribute 
to the firm’s domestic and international image. Since many of the Japanese firms are highly 
active internationally, including a foreign board member from that region could further be 
seen as a way to give the employees in the region some form of representation and a voice on 
the company’s handling recent handling of matters there. A prime example of a diverse firm 
from the sample is 105 year old Hitachi, the 3rd largest firm in the sample. In 2013 they 
included so much as one female and two male foreign board members on their corporate 
board. The author is convinced that when large firms like Hitachi sets an example, smaller 
firms will follow in their footsteps, diversifying their board room as well as employees to 
better respond to the global challenges that firms face today. 
 
When the asset price bubble burst in the 1990’s, Japanese firms saw an opportunity for 
change. This willingness to adapt to another system, when in times of crisis has helped many 
Japanese firms to increase the transparency within the firms in in their actions. Foreign 
investors have further assisted in this change, pushing firms to be at the forefront of having a 
good and efficient corporate governance system. This thesis results suggests that the effort to 
change the governance in firms are worth its while, encouraging a continued convergence 
towards the Anglo-American corporate governance system for the near time to come.  
 
Lastly, the author would like remind the readers about the possible issues related to the 
internal validity when interpreting the results of the study. As mentioned in chapter 4, study 
might be affected by endogeneity issues not accounted for by the fixed-effects estimators 
applied in the methodology. The author suggests that given more time and resources, a larger 
sample with access to exogenous instrumental variables could be used to try to mitigate some 
of these possible issues in further studies.     
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7.1 Further research 
During the work process for this thesis, some points which could be of interest for future 
research has been encountered, but deemed impossible through the spectrum of this study. 
 
Examine the effects of Japanese board members with international experience. 
 
One interesting aspect of this study is how much of the increased effects that can actually be 
attributed to the nationality of the board members, and how much that is actually experience. 
The author believes that the difference in nationality could both lead to many eye-opening 
experiences in the board room as-well as being sources of miscommunication. If the 
performance effects of both outsider Japanese directors with international experience and 
outsider foreign directors would be compared, more light could be shed on which traits that 
actually have a positive impact on firm performance. 
 
Investigate the reasons for which Japanese firms recruit foreign directors. 
 
It would be of great importance to find the characteristics of firms who are deciding to recruit 
foreign directors. By knowing these characteristics, more details could be provided in the 
question how foreign directors affect firm performance and how firms make changes in 
corporate governance after including a foreign director.   
 
Evaluate if corporate governance has changed in Japanese companies that has large 
domestic institutional shareholdings during recent years. 
 
After seeing the benefits that the active foreign owners grant their investment targets one 
would want to see if the Japanese investment funds will strengthen the demands on the firms 
in which they own shares in. The author therefore suggests to examine how corporate 
governance changes in firms with large domestic institutional ownership in the near future. 
  
49 
  
Bibliography 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M. & Matos, P., 2011. Does governance travel around the 
world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 100, 
pp. 154-181. 
Ahmadjian, C., 2007. Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan 1, New York: 
Oxford University press. 
Ahmadjian, C. L. & Robbins, G. E., 2005. A Clash of Capitalisms: Foreign Shareholders and 
Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan. American Sociological Review, 70(3), pp. 451-471. 
Anderson, A.-M. & Gupta, P. P., 2013. Corporate Governance: Does One Size Fit All?. The 
Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 24(3), pp. 51-64. 
Asian Corporate Governance Association, 2008. White Paper on Corporate Governance in 
Japan, Hong Kong : Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) . 
Baba, N., 2009. Increased presence of foreign investors and dividend policy of Japanese 
firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Volume 17, pp. 163-174. 
Bank of Japan, 2013. Monetary Policy, Tokyo: s.n. 
Benes, N., 2011. The Fukushima Warning. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304569504576403114208283514 
[Accessed 3 2 2015]. 
Boesler, M., 2013. The thruth about abenomics - The Japanese Economic Experiment That's 
Captivating the World. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-abenomics-2013-3?IR=T 
[Accessed 13 05 2015]. 
Brooks, C., 2008. Introductory Econometrics for Finance. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bryman, A. & Bell, E., 2003. Företagsekonomiska forskningsmetoder. 1:1 ed. Malmö: Liber 
Ekonomi. 
Buchanan, J., 2009. In the Shadow of Corporate Governance Reform: Change and Continuity 
in Managerial Practice at Listed Companies in Japan, New York: s.n. 
Dybvig, P. H. & Warachka, M., 2010. Tobin's q Does Not Measure Firm Performance: 
Theory, Empirics, and Alternatives, s.l.: Singapore Management University. 
Eberhart, R., 2012. Corporate governance systems and firm value: emperical evidence from 
Japan's natural experiment. Journal of Asia Business Studies, 6(2), pp. 176-196. 
50 
  
Economist, 2001. A survey of global equity markets - The rise and the fall. The Economist, 3 
5.  
Economist, 2002. A critical mass of disgust?, Tokyo: s.n. 
Economist, 2007. JapAnglo-Saxon capitalism. Economist, 385(8557), pp. 17-18. 
Fama, E. F., 1970. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), pp. 383-417. 
Ferris, S. P. & Park, K., 2005. Foreign ownership and firm value: Evidence from Japan. 
Advances in Financial Economics, Volume 11, pp. 1-29. 
Financial Services Agency, 2015. Electronic Disclosure for Investors' NETwork. [Online]  
Available at: http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/ 
[Accessed 03 04 2015]. 
Flannery, P. N., 2011. Did Management Problems at TEPCO Cause Japan's $15B Radiation 
Leak?, s.l.: s.n. 
Foerster, S. R. & Karolyi, G. A., 1999. The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor 
Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States. The 
Journal of Finance, 54(3), pp. 981-1013. 
Fujishima, H., 2009. Daiwa Institute of Research. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.dir.co.jp/souken/research/report/esg/cg/09112402cg.pdf 
[Accessed 05 02 2015]. 
Gadada, A. M. & Thomas, H. M., 2005. Sources of shareholders’ wealth. Applied Financial 
Economics, Volume 15, pp. 137-141. 
Harvey & R, C., 2011. Financial Glossary. [Online]  
Available at: http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Segmented+Market 
[Accessed 26 02 2015]. 
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G. & Palia, D., 1999. Understanding the determinants of 
managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Volume 53, pp. 353-384. 
Jackson, G. & Miyajima, H., 2007. Introduction: The Diversity and Change of Corporate 
Governance in Japan 1. In: Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and 
Organizational Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jacoby, S., 2004. The embedded corporation: Corporate Governance and Employment 
Relations in Japan and the United States. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Johansson, M. & Sawaguchi, K., 2009. Internationalization of Corporate Governance in 
Japan.  
51 
  
La porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R., 2002. Investor Protection and 
Corporate Valuation. The Journal of Finance, 57(3), pp. 1147-1169. 
Loderer, C. & Waelchli, U., 2011. Firm age and governance, Bern: s.n. 
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C. & Xie, F., 2012. Globalizing the boardroom - The effects of foreign 
directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Issue 53, pp. 527-554. 
Miller, D. P., 1999. The market reaction to international cross-listings: Evidence from 
Depositary Receipts. Journal of Financial Economics , 51(1), pp. 103-123. 
Morikawa, M., 2014. What Types of Companies Have Female and Foreign Directors?, 
Canberra: The Australian University, Japan Research Centre. 
Muller-Kahle, M., Wang, L. & Wu, J., 2014. Board structure: an empirical study of firms in 
Anglo-American governance. Managerial Finance, 40(7), pp. 681 - 699. 
Mullineux, A., 2010. Is there an Anglo-American corporate governance model?. International 
Economics & Economic Policy, pp. 437-448. 
Nakano, M. & Nguyen, P., 2013. Foreign ownership and firm performance: evidence from 
Japan's electronics industry. Applied Finacial Economics, Volume 23, pp. 41-50. 
Nakao, M., 2008. Changing Corporate Governance Practices in China and Japan, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Nguyen, P., 2012. The impact of foreign investors on the risk-taking of Japanese firms. 
Journal of The Japanese and International Economies, Volume 26, pp. 233-248. 
Nisa, S., 2008. The Divergent Corporate Governance Standards and the Need for Universally 
Acceptable Governance Practices. Asian Social Science, 4(9), pp. 128-136. 
Oxelheim, L., Gregoric, A., Randøy, T. & Thomsen, S., 2013. On the internationalization of 
corporate boards: The case of Nordic firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 
Volume 44, pp. 173-194. 
Oxelheim, L. & Randøy, T., 2003. The impact of foreign board membership on firm value. 
Journal of banking & finance, Issue 27, pp. 2369-2392. 
Oxelheim, L. et al., 1998. Corporate Strategies to Internationalise the Cost of Capital. 
Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. 
Pandey, A., 2014. Japan's Economy Shrinks in Q2 From Higher Sales Tax Effect, Stokes 
Deflation Fears. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/japans-economy-shrinks-q2-higher-sales-tax-effect-
stokes-deflation-fears-1656980 
[Accessed 13 05 2015]. 
52 
  
Phung, D. N. & Le, T. P. V., 2013. Foreign Ownership, Capital Structure and Firm 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms. IUP Journal of Corporate 
Governance, 12(2), pp. 40-58. 
Piekkari, R., Lars, O. & Randøy, T., 2015. The Silent Board: How Language Diversity May 
Influence the Work Processes of Corporate Boards. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review , 23(1), pp. 25-41. 
Reese, W. A. & Weisbach, M. S., 2002. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-
listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 66(1), pp. 65-104. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W., 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(3), pp. 461-488. 
Stulz, R. M., 1999. Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 3(12), pp. 8-25. 
Sugai, D. et al., 2008. Gaikokujintorishimariyaku ga kigyoukachi ni ataeru eikyou ni tsuite no 
kousatsu [Discussing the effects from foreign directors on firm performance], Tokyo: Waseda 
University. 
Sundaram, A. K. & Logue, D. E., 1996. Valuation Effects of Foreign Company Listings on 
U.S. Exchanges. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(1), pp. 67-88. 
Thomsen, S., 2008. An introduction to corporate governance: mechanisms and systems. 1st 
ed. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing. 
TOEFL, 2013. Test scores data summary for TOEFL iBT Tests. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ets.org/s/toefl/pdf/94227_unlweb.pdf 
[Accessed 12 05 2015]. 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2009. Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book, Tokyo: s.n. 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2013. Share Ownership Survey, Tokyo: s.n. 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2015. Japan Exchange Group. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/ 
[Accessed 29 04 2015]. 
Tricker, B., 2012. Corporate Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Yin, R. K., 2014. Case study research : design and methods. 5th ed. London: SAGE. 
  
  
53 
  
Appendix 1 
1.1 List of companies included in the sample 
This is a list of the 250 firms contained in the sample. All firms are registered on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange first section. 
 Table 1.1 List of firms 
Toyota Motor Corp Nippon Steel & Sumikin 
Bussan 
Nippon Sheet Glass 
Nippon Teleg/Teleph. Shin-Etsu Chemical Tokyo Electron Ltd. 
Hitachi, Ltd. Kubota Corporation Vital Ksk Hold 
Honda Motor Co., Ltd Nh Foods Ltd Alps Electric Co. 
Nissan Motor Co. Toyota Boshoku Corp Toyoda Gosei Co. 
Panasonic Corp J Front Retailin Don Quijote Holdings 
Sony Corp Kawasaki Kisen Nippon Suisan Kaisha 
Toshiba Corporation Astellas Pharma Inc Odakyu Electric Rail 
Toyota Tsusho Corp Hakuhodo Dy Hldgs Ntn Corp 
Tokyo Electric Power Daiichi Sankyo Izumi Co., Ltd. 
Mitsubishi Corp Jtekt Corp Hitachi Metals, Ltd. 
Aeon Co Ltd Kanematsu Corp Jgc Corp 
Seven & I Hldgs Co Kintetsu Corp Fujikura Ltd. 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Yamazaki Baking Co. Otsuka Corp 
Fujitsu Limited Sekisui Chemical Co. Leopalace21 Corp 
Ntt Docomo Inc. Nintendo Co Ltd Seino Holdings Co 
Marubeni Corp Fast Retailing Co Kewpie 
Nippon Stl.& Sumit.Mtl. Seiko Epson Life Corporation 
Itochu Corp Nikon Corporation H2o Retailing Corp 
Idemitsu Kosan Co Furukawa Electric Co Brother Industries 
Canon Inc. San-Ai Oil Co., Ltd. Hokuriku Elec. Power 
Mitsubishi Electric Takashimaya Co., Ltd Nok Corp 
Kddi Corp Tdk Corp Air Water Inc 
Sojitz Corp Olympus Corp Megmilk Snow Brand 
Denso Corp Renesas Electron Kamei Corporation 
Nec Corp Sumitomo Metal Mng. Rengo Co., Ltd. 
Bridgestone Corp Showa Denko K.K. Kinden Corporation 
Jfe Holdings Inc Dic Corporation Haseko Corp 
Softbank Corp Sumitomo Forestry Co Japan Pulp & Paper 
Sumitomo Corp Shinsho Corp Toda Corp 
Mitsubishi Chem Teijin Limited Daiwabo Holdings 
Cosmo Oil Co Ltd Edion Corp Hitachi Chemical Co. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind Konica Minolta Inc Lawson Inc 
Tonengeneral Sekiyu Hitachi Const Mach Taiyo Nippon Sanso 
Kansai Elec. Power Taiheiyo Cement Corp Nissan Shatai Co 
Medipal Holdings Calsonic Kansei Corp Toho Gas Co., Ltd. 
Sharp Corpor Century Sapporo Holdings Ltd 
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Showa Shell Sekiyu Fuji Electric Inabata & Co., Ltd. 
East Japan Railway Toyo Seikan Group Shimamura Co., Ltd. 
Suzuki Motor Corp Kato Sangyo Co., Ltd Kaneka Corporation 
Chubu Electric Power Eisai Co Ltd Nhk Spring Co., Ltd. 
Japan Tobacco Inc. K's Holdings Corp Kandenko Co., Ltd. 
Aisin Seiki Co Ltd Sumitomo Rubber Ind. Hitachi Transport 
Alfresa Holdings Nsk Ltd. Nichirei Corp 
Fujifilm Holdings Secom Co., Ltd. Hikari Tsushin, Inc. 
Mazda Motor Corp Shiseido Co., Ltd. Itoham Foods Inc. 
Kirin Holdings Co Tosoh Corp Pioneer Corp 
Sumitomo Electric Nidec Corp Toto Ltd. 
Ricoh Company, Ltd. Fuji Oil Nisshin Seifun 
Yamada Denki Co. Canon Marketing Daido Steel Co Ltd 
Sumitomo Chemical Co Hankyu Hanshin Oki Electric Inds. 
Mitsubishi Shok T-Gaia Corp Mitsubishi Gas Chem 
Dentsu Inc Nagase & Co., Ltd. Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. 
Nippon Yusen K.K. Bic Camera Inc Fanuc Ltd. 
Suzuken Co., Ltd. Electric Power Dev Ebara Corp 
Daiwa House Industry Nitto Denko Corp Dcm Holdings 
Komatsu Ltd. Mitsui Engin. & Ship Bandai Namco 
Kobe Steel, Ltd. Iwatani Corp Matsumotokiyoshi 
Mitsubishi Motors Hitachi High-Tech Benesse Holding 
Tohoku Elec. Power Nagoya Railroad Co. Rakuten Inc 
Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd. Ube Industries, Ltd. Mitsui Mining/Smelt. 
Daihatsu Motor Co Arata Corp Unicharm Corp 
Fuji Heavy Inds. Murata Manufacturing Daio Paper Corp 
Nippon Express Co. Omron Corp Marui Group Co 
Asahi Kasei Fuji Media Holding Mitsubishi Tanabe 
Asahi Group Itochu-Shokuhin Co H.I.S. Co., Ltd. 
Dai Nippon Printing Morinaga Milk Ind. Hoya Corp 
Central Japan Hokkaido Electric Joshin Denki Co. 
Toray Industries Shikoku Electric Pwr Coca-Cola West 
Toppan Printing Co. Sumitomo Heavy Inds. Keio Corp 
Toyota Industries Tobu Railway Co.  
Sekisui House, Ltd. Yokohama Rubber Co  
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Appendix 2 
2.1 Correlation matrix 
Table 2.1.1 Correlation matrix 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LNQ  1.00         
 -----          
          
ROA  0.30*** 1.00        
 0.00 -----         
          
OAABM  0.02 0.06* 1.00       
 0.52 0.05 -----        
          
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP  0.21*** 0.26*** 0.19*** 1.00      
 0.00 0.00 0.00 -----       
          
FOREIGN_SUBSIDIARY  0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.26*** 1.00     
 0.81 0.17 0.41 0.00 -----      
          
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE  0.18*** 0.09*** 0.22*** 0.32*** -0.05 1.00    
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 -----     
          
BOARD_SIZE  0.09** -0.03 0.10*** -0.04 -0.10*** -0.20*** 1.00   
 0.01 0.31 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 -----    
          
LN_FIRM_AGE  0.10*** 0.01 -0.08** 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.12*** 1.00  
 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.45 0.32 0.11 0.00 -----   
          
LN_NET_SALES  -0.02 -0.08** 0.13*** 0.25*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.21*** 0.02 1.00 
 0.44 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 -----  
 
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
 
The upper number is the correlation and the lower number is the p-value which measures if 
the correlation is significant. The number in the header which are enclosed in parentheses 
represents the variables on left side in numerical order.  
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Appendix 3 
3.1 Heteroscedasticity tests 
Table 3.1.1 Tobin’s Q regression - Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 
Dependent Variable: RESID01_SQ   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/15   Time: 13:59   
Sample: 2010 2013   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 248   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 987  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     OAABM -0.003 0.017 -0.185 0.853 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP 0.051 0.030 1.686 0.092 
FOREIGN_SUBSIDIARY -0.031 0.028 -1.104 0.270 
BOARD_SIZE -0.001 0.001 -0.592 0.554 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE -0.048 0.024 -1.961 0.050 
LN_FIRM_AGE -0.012 0.005 -2.526 0.012 
LN_NET_SALES -0.004 0.004 -0.869 0.385 
C 0.151 0.090 1.691 0.091 
     
     R-squared 0.014    Mean dependent var 0.024 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007    S.D. dependent var 0.103 
S.E. of regression 0.102    Akaike info criterion -1.716 
Sum squared resid 10.219    Schwarz criterion -1.677 
Log likelihood 855.020    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.701 
F-statistic 2.043    Durbin-Watson stat 1.185 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.047**    
     
     
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 3.1.2 ROA regression - Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 
Dependent Variable: RESID02_SQ   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/15   Time: 14:06   
Sample: 2010 2013   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 248   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 985  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     OAABM -2.263 1.986 -1.139 0.255 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP 7.430 3.556 2.089 0.037 
FOREIGN_SUBSIDIARY -1.934 3.299 -0.586 0.558 
BOARD_SIZE -0.193 0.104 -1.853 0.064 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE -3.091 2.839 -1.089 0.277 
LN_FIRM_AGE -0.919 0.549 -1.675 0.094 
LN_NET_SALES 0.027 0.510 0.052 0.958 
C 7.651 10.476 0.730 0.465 
     
     R-squared 0.013    Mean dependent var 3.431 
Adjusted R-squared 0.006    S.D. dependent var 11.974 
S.E. of regression 11.938    Akaike info criterion 7.805 
Sum squared resid 139235.868    Schwarz criterion 7.845 
Log likelihood -3836.161    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.821 
F-statistic 1.850    Durbin-Watson stat 1.002 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.074616*    
     
     
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
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Appendix 4 
4.1 Fixed effects testing 
Table 4.1.1 Tobin’s Q regression - redundant fixed effects testing 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F*** 29.735878 (247,729) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square*** 2373.439960 247 0.0000 
Period F*** 33.182284 (3,729) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square*** 126.335657 3 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F*** 29.982339 (250,729) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square*** 2391.707629 250 0.0000 
     
     
     
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 4.1.2 ROA regression - redundant fixed effects tests 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F*** 5.435166 (247,727) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square*** 1030.437145 247 0.0000 
Period F*** 9.972006 (3,727) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square*** 39.720941 3 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F*** 5.518437 (250,727) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square*** 1047.949791 250 0.0000 
     
     
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
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4.2 Random effects testing 
Table 4.2.1 Tobin’s Q regression - Hausman test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random*** 41.696703 7 0.0000 
     
     
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 4.2.2 ROA regression – Hausman test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random*** 75.408565 7 0.0000 
     
     
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
** = Significant at the 5% level 
* = Significant at the 10% level 
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Appendix 5 
5.1 Residuals 
Figure 5.1.1 Residuals - Tobin’s Q regression 
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Std. Dev.   0.155007
Skewness  -0.803159
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Jarque-Bera  10942.55
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Figure 5.1.2 Residuals: ROA – regression 
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Are internationally 
adapted Japanese 
companies better 
performers? 
 
During the last decades, Japanese 
companies have found themselves 
struggling to improve their corporate 
governance systems. Similarly, both the 
public and foreign institutional investors 
has raised their demands to make firms 
more transparent as well as becoming 
better on monitoring the actions of the 
management.  This process of change has 
earlier been studied through observable 
corporate governance factors such as the 
size of the board and the amount of 
outsiders on the board. In an attempt to 
contribute from another angle to this field, 
Bremholm investigates the effects that 
firms employing the unusual method of 
adding a foreign director to their boards 
have on firm performance. Furthermore, 
firms that enjoys a higher degree of foreign 
ownership are evaluated to see how they 
perform against their counterparts. 
Previous studies on the inclusion of foreign 
directors have been focused on the Nordic 
and U.S. regions, yielding mixed results. 
The signaling effects of a firm being ready 
to move towards a more international 
corporate governance system were 
considered to have yielded positive results 
in the Nordic market, while the distance 
and time spent traveling in the U.S. were 
suggested to be the cause to negative 
effects. The effects from foreign ownership, 
are more widespread and include direct 
measures such as firms taking on riskier 
strategies, increase their divestitures and 
give larger dividends to the shareholders. 
These traits are strongly related to the 
American and British ways of doing 
business, and are founded on that foreign 
institutional investors have higher 
demands for return on their investments.  
In his study, Bremholm includes 250 firms 
from the Tokyo stock exchange’s first 
section and analyzes the data between 
2010 and 2013. Both Tobin’s Q and return 
on assets are used as performance 
measurements, giving opportunities to 
analyze both performance effects from the 
market, and from firm operations. To be 
able to make full use of the panel data 
methodology, fixed effects are included, 
making the sample more resistant to both 
firm specific effects such as technological 
breakthroughs and time fixed effects 
related to the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and the implementation of the new 
“Abenomics”- program, which includes 
numerous financial reforms that affected 
the stock market in a positive manner in 
2013.  
 
The results from the study shows a 
significant increase in Tobin’s Q for 
including foreign directors. The result in 
ROA however, are statistically insignificant. 
The difference in the essence of these two 
performance measures are thought to be 
the cause of these outcome. Signaling 
effects are often more related to the 
immediate market response, making 
Tobin’s Q a more accurate measurement 
for performance in these types of studies. 
Foreign ownership was linked with 
performance increases, both in Tobin’s Q 
and ROA, confirming the direct effects 
higher foreign ownership were thought to 
have on firms’ operating performance. 
Bremholm suggests further research on 
foreign directors in Japan. A study in which 
overseas experience would be taken into 
account could put a new perspective on the 
performance gain, enabling to see to what 
degree the nationality of the directors 
affect firm performance.   
